TO: NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS			p Secret 219
1 // //				(Securi:	ty Classification) <sup>25)</sup>
2				(555411	-y Giaodinoadion)
3					
ACTION DIRECT REPLY	I I DOEDA	RE REPLY			
APPROVAL DISPATCH	RECON	AMENDATION RN			
COMMENT FILE CONCURRENCE INFORMATION	RETUR SIGNAT	TUDE			
REMARKS:	TOTOTAL	· One			
					25)
					·
			will be restric		·
those a	approved fo	r the follow		activities:	·
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	25)
those a	approved fo	r the follow	ving specific	activities:	25>
Thurso	approved fo	r the follow TELLIGEN  e 1978	ving specific CE DAILY C CG NIDO	activities: CABLE C 78/133C	25)
Thurso	approved for IONAL INTERPRETATIONAL INTERPRETATIONAL	r the follow TELLIGENG e 1978  SECURITY	ving specific	activities: CABLE C 78/133C	25)

State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A03070689Wiltys Classification)

**Top Secret** 

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010046-0

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 8 June 1978.

25X1

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

## CONTENTS

ETHIOPIA: Eritrean Offensive	Page	1
USSR-JAPAN: Military Exercise	Page	4
IRAQ-USSR: Communists Executed	Page	7
COLOMBIA: Turbay Apparent Winner	Page	8
UK: Buying French Missile Engine	Page	9
MALTA: Neutrality Negotiations	Page	10
BRIEF:	Page	12
Libya-Chad		

25X1

25X1

25X1

	ETHIOPIA: Eritrean Offensive	
25X1	//Ethiopian plans for major offensive operations against the Eritrean insurgents appear to be encountering delays that may postpone the start of heavy fighting into the summer rainy season or beyond. The delays have apparently been caused by the lack of Soviet and Cuban support for a full-scale offensive, the need to mass large numbers of Ethiopian forces in the region, and the stiff opposition offered by insurgent forces to recent government probing actions.//	
25X1	Except for a brief upsurge in ground fighting in the Asmara area in mid-May and continued fighting at the isolated government garrison of Barentu, the level of sustained combat activity on the Eritrean front is considerably less than might have been expected at this point. We find this somewhat puzzling, given the fact that the rainy season—which will inhibit Ethiopian air operations—is likely to begin in a few weeks and continue through early September.	
25X1	//The recent abortive effort by Ethiopian forces	
	to break the insurgents' nine-month siege of Asmara may have dimmed the government's confidence about starting a full-scale	
25X1	offensive. The Ethiopians	\F\/4
25X1	may now be concerned that the increasing pressure on Havana and Moscow from the Arabs and members of the nonaligned movement not to become involved in Eritrea has raised the threshold at which Cuba would send troops to rescue a stalled Ethiopian offensive.//	25X1
25X1	An estimated 2,200 Cuban military advisers and technicians are attached to Ethiopian armor, artillery, and air units in Eritrea and nearby Tigre Province, but no Cuban air or ground combat units appear to have been deployed to northern Ethiopia thus far.	
25X1	//Chairman Mengistu is almost certainly determined to pursue a military option in Eritrea, but he may have some doubts about Ethiopia's ability to conduct a sustained offensive. Mengistu may calculate that by limiting the scope of operations in Eritrea, he will not need as much direct Cuban assistance.//	

If operations in Eritrea go sour, however, the Ethiopians will not hesitate to ask the Soviets and the Cubans to

bail them out. The USSR would probably agree to increase its direct support to Ethiopia, but at the same time would intensify its search for a negotiated settlement. Cuba, with casualties and diplomatic costs in mind, would be reluctant to commit combat troops but would nevertheless do so if convinced such action was necessary to preserve the Mengistu regime.
Ethiopia's Ambassador to Kenya told a Nairobi press conference last Friday that recent probes in Eritrea by government forces were not a "general" offensive along the lines of that conducted against Somali forces in the Ogaden, but rather were targeted against "selected" military objectives occupied or encircled by Eritrean insurgents. More important, the Ambassador ruled out the use of Cuban troops in Eritrea—the first time any Ethiopian official has said this.
The envoy also repeated the government's offer to negotiate with the Eritreans on the basis of its nine-point peace plan of May 1976, a vaguely defined formula for regional autonomy that the insurgents have steadfastly rejected in favor of complete independence.

25X1

25X1

4

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 -

the two beace treaty	ying the o sides and frie	eir irritati resume nego endship trea e the Chines	otiations as aty. Moscow v se insist tha	o's proposal soon as posset of the soon as posset of the sound it includes the sound of the soun	to China that sible on a pposes the a clause	
qains	t the es	stablishment	t of hegemony to the USSR.	, in Asia and	l the Far East-	
acks	on the p	proposed treer political	eaty, chargir l and milita	ng that Pekin cy ties to Ja	tepped up at- ng will use it apan in support	Ė
o for		wist foreid	an noliasz Ca	oviet media 1	nave also	
to for of its	ed that t	the US welco	omes the resu o an alliance	umption of the	ne treaty talks to exert	5


Q-USSR: Communists Executed
//Iraq has confirmed that last month it executed
qi Communists charged with attempting to establish cells in
military.
military personnel are pro- ited from joining the Communist Party or engaging in any po-
ical activity except that sanctioned by the ruling Baath
ty. The government denies that the executions indicate it is sessing its relations with the USSR.//
//The executions serve to underline Iraq's concert r the USSR's activities in the area and to warn the Soviets
inst getting involved in Iraq's internal affairs. There is
evidence, however, to support recent Syrian press speculation
t Iraq is re-examining its 1972 Treaty of Friendship with t R and is considering expelling Soviet advisers. The Syrian
rges were undoubtedly intended to embarrass Iraq and put it
the defensive.//

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1	Soviet Ambassador Barkovskiy and a special Soviet Foreign Ministry emissary visited Baghdad this week and Iraq may have used the occasion to reassure them that formal relations between the two governments will remain stable. The Iraqis seem to be trying to link the executions to internal security precautions. The local Communists were charged with circulating the National Front charter that brought the Communist Party into the government in 1973 and with conspiring in the military to overthrow the regime.//
25X1	//Newspaper editorials are warning the military about the dangers of illegal political activity, and Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn has railed against "hostile forces using religion to 25X1 achieve political objectives." This is probably a warning to the large Shiah Muslim population, which has been a source of support for the local Communist Party.
	COLOMBIA: Turbay Apparent Winner
25X1	//Liberal Party candidate Julio Cesar Turbay seems to have won a narrow victory in Sunday's election in Colombia; he will face major challenges in convincing his countrymen that he is presidential timber.//
25X1	//The lead seesawed between Turbay and his Conservative opponent, Belisario Betancur, and both contestants claimed victory before the National Registrywhich maintains the official vote countannounced Turbay's win on Tuesday. The final count must yet be ratified by the Electoral Court, a process that will take some time, particularly if it involves investigation of fraud charges and recounting votes in several contested districts. In the end, Turbay will probably be declared president-elect and be inaugurated on 7 August to begin a four-year term.//
25X1	//Turbay apparently took 48.7 percent of the votes to Betancur's 46.9 percent. Spokesmen for Betancur have challenged the authenticity of this count, and Betancur has yet to concede. If he contests the results in the courts, an extended period of political uncertainty will follow.//
25X1	//A Conservative Party leader has discounted the possibility of violence over the disputed returns, but he stressed that the situation will remain tense for some time.



25X1 //The French engine, made by Microturbo, is simi-Tar in size and thrust to the engine the US developed for its long-range cruise missile program, but its range is shorter because of relatively high fuel consumption. Microturbo's contract with the British requires that the engine be assembled in the UK.// 25X1 //There are strong pressures on the British to retain their nuclear capability, and they could do so more cheaply with a long-range cruise missile than through other options. Although long-range cruise missiles can be launched from ground or sea platforms, deployment of an air-launched missile would preserve the UK's strategic air capability by using obsolescent British Vulcan bombers or newer Jaquar or Tornado fighter-bombers as launch platforms.// //The US has preserved the option of providing the 25X1 UK with longrange cruise missiles, but the UK may prefer to deploy its own cruise missiles or those produced in cooperation with another West European power. Last month, a leading British Conservative Party defense spokesman proposed that collaboration between the UK and France in the nuclear weapons field be seriously considered. The UK will probably decide whether to proceed with an independent cruise missile program within the next year or two. MALTA: Neutrality Negotiations 25X1 //Multilateral negotiations on Malta's status after

//Multilateral negotiations on Malta's status after the British withdraw their military forces from the islands next year are apparently entering a decisive phase. Malta, France, Italy, Libya, and Algeria are attempting to devise a declaration of neutrality for Malta that would effectively exclude both Soviet and US military vessels from Maltese shipyards after 1979. The main obstacle is Prime Minister Mintoff's continued attempt to link guarantees of Maltese neutrality to pledges of economic assistance from EC and Arab countries.//

25X1

//A negotiating session last month produced several positive developments, according to Italian diplomats involved in the talks. The Maltese agreed that neutrality should be made a matter of law rather than a political concept. This presumably is designed to prevent Mintoff from giving the agreement an interpretation different from that intended by the negotiators.//

\_

25X1 //The Maltese have also agreed that the nations involved in the neutrality negotiations should ratify identical agreements; the Maltese had earlier argued that because certain participants, such as the Libyans, were willing to provide more explicit guarantees of Maltese neutrality, they should be allowed to issue their own version of the declaration. The Italian negotiator believes, finally, that the agreement will deny the Soviets access to Maltese repair and basing facilities, thus protecting Western interests.// 25X1 //From the US point of view, the most acceptable Maltese neutrality declaration would be one that specifically barred all Soviet and US naval vessels and auxiliaries from Maltese facilities. We have not seen the full text of the agreement but, according to most reports, it merely bars military vessels of countries belonging to "major alliances."// 25X1 //This version could give the Maltese Government greater freedom to interpret the treaty than it would have if US and Soviet ships were explicitly excluded. A liberal interpretation might prove advantageous to the Soviets, because of their frequent use of commercial cover for military support ships and quasi-military vessels.// 25X1 //In any event, Mintoff has made clear that he is not prepared to complete the discussions until there is agreement on an economic aid package to offset the financial loss Malta will suffer when the British leave. Although the West Germans are expected to take the lead in sounding out EC members on the issue, a letter Mintoff sent to Chancellor Schmidt six weeks ago asking about economic assistance is still unanswered. The Italian Ambassador in Valletta says his government will try to pin down West German Foreign Minister Genscher on this subject when he visits Rome later this month.// 25X1 //In a related development, a high-level Soviet trade delegation arrived in Malta on 1 June to discuss enhanced commercial relations. It is unclear whether Malta will derive any substantial economic benefit from these contacts, but they do serve Mintoff's broader interests by hinting at other policies he could pursue if the negotiations on the neutrality agreement and economic assistance fail to meet Malta's perceived needs. 25X1

Approved For Rele <del>ase 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030</del> 700010046-
--

25X1

BRIEF	
Libya-Chad	
The second phase of the peace talks among Chad, anti- government rebels, and their Libyan benefactors, scheduled for yesterday in Libya, apparently did not take place. The US Em- bassy in Ndjamena has learned informally from the Chadian Government that the negotiations may be held later. Because of a recent increase in fighting, it is doubtful that a meet- ing would accomplish much right now.	
Despite two recent military successes by the French-supported Chadian forces against the rebels, the position of President Malloum's government remains precarious. The regime's inability to cope with the insurgency and simultaneously deal with pressing economic and social problems remains unchanged and continues to fuel antigovernment sentiment.	25X

## Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010046-0 **Top Secret**

(Security Classification)